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Abstract: 
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a disorder that affects mainly women and often manifests 
itself through self-injurious behaviour and suicide attempts.  The perception that these patients are 
themselves to blame for their self-destructive behaviour is a common reaction when clinical 
practitioners are faced with this behaviour.  Recent philosophical work has tried to reconceptualise 
the responsibility of personality disorder patients (i.e. Pickard’s responsibility without blame).  In 
this paper I problematise the focus on responsibility as a conceptual and therapeutic approach to 
deliberate self-injury in BPD.  I suggest that this thin, content-neutral account of responsibility 
fails to properly consider the complex phenomenology of BPD selfhood and self-harm.  Instead, I 
forward an alternative model based on a thick account of responsibility to examine in more detail 
the social formation of substantive content of the will.  The paper explains how borderline is a 
disorder of the self-in-relation, which tracks the socialising, relational factors that contribute to the 
development of a dysfunctional BPD selfhood premised on self-punishment, self-abnegation, and 
self-loathing.  Moreover, the framework lends itself to an alternative normative standpoint to self-
harming behaviour in individuals with BPD which focuses on the therapeutic nurturance and 
validation of emotion and needs, prior to the treatment of individuals as responsible agents.  I 
explore how such a standpoint is applied in Schema-Focused and Dialectical Behavioral Therapy 
treatments of BPD. 
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I want to begin my paper with a case study: 
 
Anne was sexually and physically abused as a child and adolescent.  Since an adolescent she 
has had episodes of engaging in self-injurious behaviour, where she repetitively cuts her arms 
with a knife or scissors, sometimes so seriously that she has had to go to A&E.  She is 
relatively high-functioning as an individual, where her academic cleverness has enabled her to 
study for a Philosophy degree at a top university.  Due to her history of deliberate self-injury, 
psychiatrists have diagnosed her with Borderline Personality Disorder.  In moments of anger 
and emotional upset, like when her psychiatrist has seemed cold towards her or her session has 
stopped early, she reverts to cutting her arms.    
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a disorder that affects largely women: 78% of those with 
the diagnosis are women; women between the ages of 16-34 are approximately 4.5 times more 
likely than men of the same demographic to be given the diagnosis (East Sussex Public Health 
Department 2013).  In the US, 1.6% of the population has BPD, which means about four million 
people in the US alone have the disorder (NIMH).  According to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-5), a ‘personality disorder’ is defined by enduring patterns of 
experience and behaviour in areas of (i) thinking; (ii) feeling; (iii) interpersonal relationships; and 
(iv) impulse control and emotional regulation.  These patterns depart from cultural norms and 
expectations, they are pervasive and inflexible, and generate distress or impairment.  More 
specifically, pathological personality traits in BPD involve impairments in self- and interpersonal 
functioning: impaired self-functioning revolve around problems of identity (i.e. poorly developed 
or unstable self-image that is often connected to excessive self-criticism, feelings of emptiness, 
and dissociative states) and self-direction (i.e. unstable goals, aspirations, and values).  Impaired 
interpersonal functioning involves hypersensitivity and fears of abandonment and rejection.  
Together, these impairments are expressed in emotionally dysregulated, maladaptive behaviours, 
such as risky behaviour, repeated self-mutilation with non- and parasuicidal intent, and suicide 
attempts.  The personal costs of PDs are significant: approximately 70% of people with BPD will 
make at least one suicide attempt throughout their life and about 10% of borderline patients 
commit suicide, a rate that is about 50 times higher than in the general population (Lieb et al 
2004). 
The diagnosis remains deeply controversial for numerous (and justifiable) reasons (Lewis 
et al 2009; Gritti et al 2016; Potter 2009), and despite the prevalence and seriousness of this 
disorder, these patients are often subject to negative, harsh, and derogatory attitudes in health 
services (Commons Treloar and Lewis 2008; Black et al 2011).  Self-destructive behaviours, 
particularly around deliberate self-injury (which can include cutting, burning, banging, hitting) 
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contribute to the widespread stigmatisation, exclusion, and mistreatment of individuals with the 
diagnosis of BPD.  As stated in a report by NIMH(E), these individuals have been called ‘difficult, 
manipulative, bed-wasters or attention-seeking’ – in short, they are ‘the patients psychiatrists 
dislike’ (NIHM(E) 2003, p. 2). The belief that borderline is untreatable and not a ‘real’ mental 
disorder – though changing slowly – remains entrenched in mental health services.  Moreover, the 
perception that these patients are themselves to blame for their self-destructive behaviour 
characterises the views of some practitioners in certain clinical and psychiatric settings.  Bowers 
states: 
 
When at large in the community [these people with personality disorder] cause problems for 
others through their antisocial and irresponsible conduct.  Their incessant and contradictory 
demands upon health service resources (e.g. through repetitive suicidal gestures like overdoses) 
evoke negative reactions from all professions.  […]  Some psychiatric staff reject them 
completely, seeing them as ‘psychological vampires’ fully responsible for their behaviour, and 
appropriate cases for punishment rather than treatment  (Bowers 2002, p. 2). 
  
Such negative views of BPD individuals can be highly detrimental to their treatment.  
Recent philosophical work has tried to respond to these troubling attitudes amongst clinicians by 
conceptualising the responsibility of individuals with personality disorder.  For example, Hanna 
Pickard (Pickard 2011) describes the rescue/blame dilemma, where clinicians have two impulses 
when faced with self-harming BPD individuals: on one hand, there is a strong impulse to hold 
BPD individuals morally culpable and blameworthy for their own self-destructive actions.  On the 
other hand, there is the inclination to ‘rescue’ the BPD individual, treating them as passive 
victims.  Pickard recommends an intermediate response between the two, positing that a 
framework of ‘responsibility without blame’ can treat individuals as personally capable of 
controlling and choosing their actions.  Instead of the affective blame which can accompany 
attributions of responsibility, Pickard recommends that responsibility can utilise what she calls 
‘detached’ blame which ‘consists in judgments of blameworthiness’ designed to influence 
subjective change by making BPD individual accountable and answerable for their actions that 
may also demand the imposition of negative consequences and limit-setting. 
In this paper, I want to problematise the focus on responsibility as a conceptual and 
therapeutic approach to deliberate self-injury in borderline individuals.  Firstly, it is not clear that 
such an approach properly understands the full phenomenology of self-harming behaviour in PD.  
Secondly, clinical responses focused on responsibility and accountability for self-harming 
behaviour tends to focus on the action rather than addressing important underlying non-intentional 
causes behind the action.  Whether these acts can be considered voluntary behaviours is debatable 
once we consider more substantive conditions of responsibility which demand responsible agents 
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to be a certain way.  This approach takes into account the oppressive socialising contexts which 
also illuminate ways in which self-harming borderline individuals lack the self-in-relation 
competence that is characteristic of an authentic, responsible self.i  Relational support and 
affective engagement (rather than disengagement) will be needed if individuals are to build up this 
competence and meet the interpersonal expectations placed onto them. 
The first section of the paper critically outlines Pickard’s view of ‘responsibility without 
blame’.  In light of weaknesses of this model, I suggest in the second section that a more 
substantive model of responsibility is required to attend the complexities in the phenomenology of 
BPD self-harm, and particularly, the process of socialisation that forms and develops a competent 
self-in-relation.  The final section illustrates these ideas generally underline the philosophy behind 
Schema-Focused and Dialectical Behavioural Therapy for borderline individuals.  
 
Problems with Responsibility Without Blame 
 
Deliberate self-injurious behaviour amongst those with borderline can be deeply 
distressing for those charged with providing them with care, often evoking strong reactive 
emotions in family members and clinicians.  Psychiatric nurses reported in one study ‘how angry 
and frustrated repeated cutting could make them.  They also reported feeling distressed, 
traumatized and stressed by the sheer ‘blood and gore’ awful things they had to deal with, and by 
the high level of the patients’ distressing emotions’ (Bowers 2002, p. 53).  Attributions of 
intentional behaviour and blameworthiness often accompany these reactive emotions – i.e. that the 
individual’s self-injury is deliberately intended to manipulate and coerce others – which can lead 
to counterproductive therapeutic attitudes and punitive responses.     
Pickard seeks to examine the cluster of ideas around this attribution of responsibility and 
blameworthiness, arguing for the philosophical and clinical importance of viewing individuals as 
responsible agents who have subjective control over their actions and choices.  More importantly, 
Pickard suggests that viewing patients as responsible is a fundamental therapeutic mechanism to 
facilitate positive change regarding habitual responses to distress and strong affect.  Self-injurious 
behaviours are not inherently morally harmful, thus confirming a common sense distinction 
between moral responsibility and responsibility for behaviour.  Moral responsibility denotes some 
kind of moral fault, whereas responsibility for behaviour suggests that individuals with BPD have 
‘conscious knowledge of what they are doing, and can exercise choice and at least a degree of 
control over the behavior’ (Pickard 2011, p. 215).  Holding someone responsible involves treating 
them as though they can account and answer for their actions.  Pickard gives examples asking 
service users to explain their choices, encouraging others ways of behaving, or the ‘agreed 
imposition of negative consequences, to increase motivation, and show that the behavior, and the 
harm it causes, is taken seriously’ (2011, p. 215). 
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This conceptual distinction between moral responsibility and responsibility for behaviour 
helps explain how a clinical stance of responsibility without blame is possible, in that 
answerability need not entail blaming responses.  But in cases where blame might be attributable 
to a patient, Pickard articulates a further distinction between two types of blame: affective blame 
has features of entitlement (of the blamer), negative affect (a punishing mental state), and ‘stings’ 
the recipient of blame.  Detached blame, by contrast, ‘consists in judgments of blameworthiness, 
and may further involve correspondingly appropriate revisions of intentions, the imposition of 
negative consequences, and accountability and answerability’ (Pickard 2013, p. 1146).  Indeed, 
there is some overlap with responsibility: detached blame ‘can have a place within effective 
clinical treatment and, in so far as they encourage responsible agency, may be essential to it’ 
(Pickard 2013, p. 1146).  If a patient is blameworthy for her behaviour, then the clinician ought to 
show detached rather than affective blame.   
At first glance, responsibility without affective blame seems an improvement to the 
treatment of self-harming borderline individuals.  Negative emotions and a sense of entitlement 
commonly accompany attributions of responsibility for self-injurious behaviour amongst clinical 
staff, where ‘cutting is seen as a deceitful way to obtain one-to-one interaction’ and the ‘suffering 
of the person is deemed to be unreasonable […] manipulative’ or forms of ‘coercion’ and 
‘bullying’ (Bowers 2002, pp. 54, 53).  Rather than reacting out of fear, anger, frustration, disgust, 
distress or stress, this approach recommends clinical responses which encourage the subjective 
control and agency of individuals with BPD, so that the individuals themselves choose less 
destructive ways of coping.  Returning to Anne, she would be assumed to be responsible for 
cutting herself (in that it is within her capacity to control her behaviour and do otherwise, even if 
this capacity is weak).  A clinician, family member or friend should not treat her as a justifiable 
recipient of affective blame and attribute moral fault to her character, but they can treat her as an 
agent who cuts herself consciously and intentionally.  Responses to Anne’s behaviour might 
include questions asking her to justify her behaviour and explain to her how such actions may 
violate people’s boundaries.  If Anne refuses to be accountable and continues to cut her arms in 
defiance of our recommendations, we might impose negative consequences to try and encourage 
change her behaviour (i.e. clinicians could refuse treatment to her or discharge her from mental 
health services, place her in an isolated unit, withhold soothing contact after her self-harming 
episodes).  Anne’s therapy would encourage her to ‘face aspects of [her] personalit[y] and 
behavior that are harmful to [herself] and others, and take responsibility for them.  That process 
typically involves painful self-reflection, and the potential for self-blame, shame, and guilt’ 
(Pickard 2011, p. 220).  Ultimately, the aim would be to change Anne’s behaviour by presuming 
her capacity to control her actions and engage in less self- and other-harming, maladative coping 
mechanisms.  As Pickard states, ‘In the face of this complexity, one thing remains clear: clinicians, 
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family, friends, and others need to hold service users with disorders of agency responsible for their 
behavior, and ask that they change it, when it causes harm to self or others’ (2013, p. 1150).  
Responsibility in this sense is content-neutral: the moral perspective of rightness and 
wrongness are set aside (Pickard 2013, p. 1141).  Questions about the content of one’s will are 
also set aside – agency seems to revolve around the procedural ability to control and choose 
behaviour.  Although Pickard states that the responsibility and blameworthiness of borderline 
individuals who self-harm might be mitigated due to mentalisation defects, an impoverished 
history, or experiences of trauma, it is never fully extinguished nor can they be fully absolved for 
their behaviour.  Clinicians need to consider the background narratives, traumatic histories and 
limited options of the individual to cultivate empathy and compassion so as to drive away affective 
blame, but it is not to alter the view as to whether or not the person is responsible for their actions. 
Moreover, external attributions of responsibility may have priority over subjective 
experience or understanding of action.  This isn’t to say that the individual’s narrative doesn’t 
matter or isn’t taken into account, as Pickard suggests how these are important.  But say that 
Anne’s narratives describe how she feels completely out of control when she is cutting her arms 
and cannot help herself, or how this is her way of expressing control over her strong affect.  
Anne’s narrative presents a two-pronged challenge to the clinician who views her as responsible in 
Pickard’s sense: in the first case, her firsthand experience implies a lack of agency and control 
over her self-harming action, or the psychological and motivational capacity to exercise control is 
absent.  The phenomenology of her own experience suggests she falls short of responsibility, in 
which case, the clinician who views and treats her as in control of her action departs from her own 
understanding of her behaviour.  In the second case, Anne would be expressing her agency and 
control as best as she sees fit but fall short of how most clinicians envisage adaptive, ‘in control’ 
behaviour.  Again, her manner of asserting control over her actions departs from the normative 
perspective of the clinician.  Simply put, borderline individuals may not share the same 
understanding of responsibility and control as the clinician.   
Yet from the perspective of responsibility without blame, these subjective narratives are 
validated in so far as they might heighten empathy and extinguish affective blame in clinicians – 
they might mitigate some of her responsibility, but do not fully absolve her of it.  Others ought to 
treat the person with BPD as if she can account for her behaviour and are in control of her actions, 
and through strategies such as limit-setting and behavioural training, the individual comes to learn 
less self- or other-harming behaviours and responses.  Pickard purports that most effective 
psychological treatments of personality disorders, either implicitly or explicitly, ‘are united in 
treating service users as responsible agents, capable of controlling their behavior, and deciding to 
change’ (2011, p. 213), requiring service users ‘to choose and learn to act otherwise, if they are to 
improve, let alone recover’ (2011, p. 210).  Even more strongly put, ‘the cost of avoiding blame by 
denying service users agency and thus absolving them from responsibility is high: it precludes 
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both clinician and service user alike from rationally pursuing psychological treatment, leaving 
only medication as an option’ (2013, p. 1139).   
There are two issues with this emphasis on responsibility.  First, particularly when the 
BPD individual’s experience of agency might depart significantly from that of her clinicians, it 
seems to me that there is a danger that such an approach could inadvertently revert to a punitive 
response to self-harm from the perspective of the person with BPD, even if the intentions of the 
clinicians are otherwise.  Second, the content-neutrality of this framework fails to track the 
complex phenomenology of self-injury and fractured selfhood in BPD and how this might bear on 
our conceptual understanding of responsibility.  These will be explained in this and the next 
section respectively. 
The first issue becomes pressing when we consider what happens after Anne is held to 
account for her self-injurious behaviour, when she begins to cut herself again, and the manner in 
which Anne is held responsible.  As Pickard herself states, responsibility without blame does not 
rule out the possibility of imposing negative consequences and limit-setting to discourage the 
behaviour – indeed, this is part and parcel of treating individuals as accountable agents.  But there 
is the possibility that this approach could revert to a punitive response to self-harm.ii  Even if the 
intent behind holding the person responsible is admirable, it could be subjectively understood by 
the patient as a mode of punishment that could exacerbate the triggers for self-injurious behaviour.   
For instance, how responsibility without blame – or indeed, detached blame in certain 
circumstances – qualitatively differs from stigma-driven emotional withdrawal in its subjective 
impact on the borderline individual is unclear.  The focus on responsibility suggests individuals 
need to account for themselves should they fail to implement change in their behaviour.  But 
compare this with explanations of stigma-driven emotional withdrawal.  Pre-existing stigma about 
the disorder amongst clinical staff (i.e. how difficult these people are) often frame interpretations 
of self-injury (as a form of manipulative behaviour); emotional withdrawal and voluntary distance 
is then viewed as a justifiable and appropriate response (Aviram et al 2006).  Clinicians with 
negative attitudes towards those with personality disorder commonly make behaviouristic 
judgements that patients have the ability to control behaviour and symptoms, and therefore need to 
‘learn’ through sanctions and consequences, as a way of inducing self-control (Bowers 2002; 
Lewis and Appleby 1988).  Pickard’s description of both responsibility and detached blame has 
some behaviouristic overtones, stressing the importance of ‘appropriate revisions of intentions’ 
and where needed, ‘the imposition of negative consequences, and accountability and 
answerability’ (2013).  But calling attention to the behaviour, even whilst avoiding the anger or 
entitlement of affective blame, can at times exacerbate the triggers for self-harm.  Emotional 
withdrawal, affective detachment, or the instalment of consequences and limit-setting, often 
prompts fears of abandonment and rejection for the borderline individual, intensifying self-
negating mechanisms which can motivate self-injury. ‘It is not difficult to imagine how a 
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therapist’s emotional distancing can unconsciously initiate desperate reactions by a person with 
BPD,’ Aviram et al state.  ‘For example, sensitivity about rejection and its association with being 
unworthy can increase self-loathing and, ultimately, self-destructive behaviors’ (2006, p. 252). 
In response, Pickard might claim that these potential harms are avoidable with an 
empathetic stance.  Empathy and compassion comes with attending to individuals’ past history and 
backgrounds, allowing clinicians to better understand why individuals behave they way they do.  
‘A fuller life story or narrative comes into view’, she writes, in which the service user is seen not 
only as one who harms, but as one who has been harmed’ (2011, p. 220).  Stigma-driven 
detachment and holding someone to account are qualitatively different, one might argue, simply 
by virtue of the presence of empathy.  Empathy tempers affective blame so that, even if we have to 
hold someone as ‘blameworthy’, detached blame is achievable.  However, as Potter rightly 
suggests, whether empathy can coexist with detached blame is questionable.  As well as cognitive 
judgements, the ability to affectively engage with someone is a key constituent of empathy (Potter 
2011; Kong 2015).  Warmth, feeling, and a sense of genuine caring all help make empathy 
effective and real to another human being.  Pickard nonetheless claims that detached blame may be 
an ‘essential’ part of ‘effective clinical treatment’ (Pickard 2013, p. 1146).  Yet the subjective 
impact of strategies used to hold individuals answerable for their behaviour, whether it be 
responsibility without blame or the appropriate use of detached blame, might not substantively 
differ from that which stems from stigma-driven detachment or negative behaviouristic 
judgements.  
Potter moreover rightly argues that it is neither fair nor accurate to attribute certain 
motives and reasons behind the BPD individual’s self-harming behaviour, especially ‘without 
critical reflection into the service user’s perspective, the clinician-service user relationship, and the 
cultural influences on the clinician’s interpretation’ (Potter 2011, p. 226).  From Anne’s point of 
view, it seems unlikely that she grasps the full range of options and has the motivational capacity 
to choose to behave in ways that are in fact external and alien to her.  If reasons to stop cutting her 
arm have no ‘grip’ or traction with her, why should we assume it is within her subjective power to 
choose otherwise?  Phenomenological accounts of self-injury indicate that such behaviour in itself 
expresses an attempt to regulate and gain control over strong affect and extreme distress.  Other 
self-abnegating motives behind self-injury include blaming and punishing the self (Brown et al 
2002).  Self-harm moreover has been described as a ‘paradoxical solacer’, where the notion that 
cutting provides comfort is contrary to most people other than those with borderline: even as it is 
an external, expressive act, it shares aspects with an ‘internalized sense of soothing and object 
constancy because cutting can be relied upon to be available on demand to comfort and diminish 
pain’ (Gallop 2002, p. 20).   
Crucially, these subjective reasons are often egosyntonic: the behaviour is consistent with 
an individual’s personal identity or internal narrative.  The egosyntonic nature of the disorder 
  9 
suggests that the self might technically ‘control’ or ‘intend’ to engage in repetitive self-mutilating 
behaviour (e.g. cutting), such behaviour is also consistent with one’s higher-order preferences (e.g. 
the need to control affect and relieve pain, the belief that one deserves punishment) and it likewise 
enjoys the endorsement of the self that has been inculcated and internalised as a child (e.g. 
overarching beliefs that she is worthless and undeserving of anything good).  However harmful 
these coping behaviours, the reasons behind them are consistent and valid expressions of the 
agent’s motivational structure, reflect the options that are available to her, and fulfil a certain 
function, which may well be an attempt to assert control over herself and her situation.  Self-
harming behaviour is explicable and intentional, but not necessarily perceived as maladaptive and 
wrong from the subjective point of view.  Without an alternative frame of reference or picture of 
the self (i.e. ‘I am worthy of respect’, ‘I don’t deserve to be punished’, ‘I am not going to be 
abandoned’) then it means that this subjective reality will feed into what behaviours and actions 
make sense to the self; her distorted understanding of the self is presumed to be true, accurate and 
is fully endorsed.   
One might still insist that the mechanisms of change in therapy for BPD must necessarily 
presuppose responsibility over the self from the very beginning – that one is an active participant 
rather than passive recipient of external or internal influences.  In short, individuals have to be 
willing to address and change the subjective experience of action and this rests on the presumption 
that such individuals are responsible agents in the first instance.  Thus, the basis of any productive 
therapeutic relationship is to draw attention to a patient’s self-responsibility, so that she may be 
open to the critical evaluation of her perceptions, beliefs, values, and aims.iii 
In the first instance, I am sceptical that this is always the case (as we will see in the third 
section) – a productive therapeutic relationship in fact need not be entirely focused on self-
responsibility and opening channels of critical evaluation.  As we will see in my discussion of 
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy and Schema-Focused Therapy, these might be implicit long-term 
goals, or aims that are to be achieved further down the line in subsequent phases of treatment once 
a trusting, stable therapeutic alliance has been established.  But therapies, for good reason, do not 
uniformly focus on the BPD patient’s self-responsibility, nor necessarily enjoin the person to 
directly engage in critical assessment of her maladaptive coping and behaving.  
Second, this argument expresses the worry that if we set aside an account of responsibility 
premised on critical reflection and volitional control, we end up assuming that individuals are 
mere passive observers who don’t act, who have no role in their own healing and subjective 
change.  This would seem an anathema to the whole point of therapeutic treatments.  From this 
approach, cutting, burning, etc. would be classified as acts that can be controlled, or more 
fundamentally, that there is a capacity to control these acts.  However, self-responsibility 
conceived of as volitional control mistakenly assumes that agency is exhausted by subjective 
power over actions, or to change one’s behaviour in light of self- and other-assessments.  There is 
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the further assumption that a rejection of responsibility in this sense requires committing oneself to 
a strict dichotomy between passivity and activity.  But as the next section shows, I neither deny the 
agency of BPD individuals nor am committed to this passive-active dichotomy.  Labelling BPD 
patients as passive victims is deeply disempowering and perpetuates harmful stereotypes which 
question whether these individuals are agents who deserve consideration.  Rather, BPD self-harm 
reveals the breadth of interactivity within practical agency, particularly in instances of 
psychological trauma and oppression.  This is important if our conceptualisations of agency are to 
acknowledge a person’s biography and her status as a victim of oppression and harm warranting 
repair or redress (see Meyers, forthcoming).  Such individuals may be agents but not necessarily 
responsible.  A more relational perspective of how BPD selfhood develops will draw attention to 
how it falls short of certain competency conditions of responsibility, as well as help justify the 
normative force of certain ways of relating to ourselves and towards others – even as they are 
initially external to the patient herself.  Moreover, as the third section of the paper explores, the 
force of these reasons can be reinforced, not necessarily through a framework of responsibility, but 
by clinicians providing non-punitive validation and nurturing to heal the fractured self in the first 
instance. 
 
Self-Relating Competency Conditions and Developing Borderline Psychopathology 
 
As seen thus far, the problems experienced by borderline individuals are commonly 
assumed to have a purely intrapsychic origin; fixing them will therefore depend on one’s internal 
resolve for change.  This appeals to a picture of responsible agency as the power to exercise 
volitional control over one’s behaviour and action, where its normativity rests on conditions of 
executive control and critical reflection rather than standards of valuable action.  Feminists rightly 
challenge this picture on two grounds: first, it is implicitly gendered through its celebration of 
norms that are quite removed from women’s experiences, such as the priority of reason over 
emotion and bodily coping, individual power and control over relational support and 
interdependency.  Second, it abstracts from the patriarchal norms and social practices that can 
infiltrate one’s psychology, affecting one’s agency and choices.  Background oppressive norms 
can fundamentally distort a person’s selfhood, values, and desires, inhibiting the authentic 
exploration of the self.  Or these norms could pathologise certain emotions in women, as is 
commonly noted in the value-laden description of anger in BPD individuals (Potter 2009).  This 
suggests we should be cautious about imposing this normative framework on a diagnosis that 
disproportionately affects women.   
Responsibility has resonance for both philosophers and practitioners because our actions 
disclose our normative orientation – namely the standards of action and conduct that we apply for 
ourselves.  But this self-disclosure reveals all sorts of things – not just whether a person has 
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control over their actions, but also whether or not a person has normative competence – the ability 
to understand, appreciate and apply certain standards of action and conduct to ourselves (Benson 
1990, 1994).  In Susan Wolf’s words, such normative competence requires us to ‘be a certain way, 
even if it is not within our power to determine whether we are that way or not’ (Wolf 1988, p. 55).  
Conditions of normative competence mean that we consider, not just whether someone like Anne 
has freedom of action (conditions of behavioural control), but whether she meets the conditions of 
freedom of will – namely the freedom to govern those desires or values that one chooses to make 
effective in action.  Our valuational system must reflect ‘a desire that our self be connected to the 
world in a certain way,’ to have beliefs about ourselves and our situation within the world which 
allow us to enact change within it or to take responsibility for who we are, despite the fact that we 
ourselves did not create who we are (Wolf 1988, p. 55).  In short, certain agentic skills that make 
one responsive to reality or certain reasons are important conditions of responsibility, where one 
appreciates and is aware of certain normative standards that apply, and the ability to apply these in 
a manner that helps disclose oneself in an authentic manner.   
Responsibility as normative competence focuses attention on how one develops the range 
of skills, capacities, and psychological and epistemic values needed to develop such appreciation 
and awareness in the first place.  Crucially, this is contingent on socialisation in important ways.  
Our appreciation of features in the world involves a social process of constituting personal identity 
and presupposes the inculcation of emotional, perceptual, motivational, and cognitive 
competencies.  For example, our relational context might discourage or suppress the procedural 
conditions of the will (i.e. subjective control and abilities) that are central to intentional agency.  It 
could shape the substantive content of the will (i.e. perceptions of ourselves, our relationships, and 
the world around us) in such a way that tracks reality or rests on distortion, conducive to 
expanding or reducing our perceived options accordingly.  On this account, I take agency to 
encompass the capacity for a range of actions – including, not just intentional action motivated by 
reasons, mental states, and conscious willing, but also embodied actions that are involved in our 
everyday coping, engagement with, and responsiveness to the world around us (Dreyfus 2014). 
Moreover, responsibility as normative competence does not rest on a passive / active 
dichotomy which fuelled the objection discussed earlier.  In fact, this more nuanced account helps 
us understand how BPD individuals can be victims and still be agents.  On one hand, looking at 
how the substantive content of the will is socially formed takes into consideration how a person 
might be a victim – i.e. the oppressive relational / social / cultural circumstances which shape the 
maladaptive psychological reactions lying behind one’s actions.  On the other hand, the ways in 
which a person engages with that oppressive environment can be understood as interactivity rather 
than passivity (Meyers, forthcoming).  This mode of engagement isn’t necessarily conscious, 
effortful, or deliberate action, but includes embodied, subconscious interactions, based on mimetic 
capacities and linguistic, interpretive skills.  Interactivity so described demands relevant forms of 
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capacitation – capacities of varying levels of awareness and deliberation which enable 
interactivity.  
Agency as interactivity and capacitation means the BPD individual remains an agent but 
isn’t responsible for her self-harm: her interactivity with deeply oppressive, unchosen situation and 
circumstance means she still acts, but these are based on false, distorted desires, epistemic beliefs, 
and so on.  She might be coping with her situation, enduring pain and trauma, adjusting her 
feelings and desires based on the resources she has and which are available to her.  As Meyers 
states, ‘[w]hat may appear to be passive submission from the outside is anything but from the 
perspective of the victim’ (forthcoming).  This is why a narrow focus on responsibility as internal 
control and critical self-reflection in some respects misses the point.  Both Pickard and I agree that 
BPD individuals are agents, even as they are self-harming or attempting suicide.  But whereas 
Pickard would say this indicates they can be held accountable for their actions, I am saying they 
cannot because a person’s interactivity and capacitation endorses certain intrapersonal frameworks 
and ways of being which reflect a lack of necessary agentic skills to be responsible.  Even as they 
are interacting with their pain, relying on their subconscious capacities of interpretation of their 
situation, the relevant forms of capacitation are fundamentally skewed: their subjectively endorsed 
ways of understanding themselves reflect socially inculcated values that fundamentally distort 
reality or reflect unjust, oppressive norms.  The fact the BPD individual might exercise control in 
some parts of her life (i.e. Anne’s localised control over her studies and education) reveals nothing 
about how her capacities of self-soothing may revolve around deeply undermining, pernicious 
views about her self which have been socially inculcated.   
The competency conditions on a more substantive account of responsibility will therefore 
involve a backdrop of self-relating skills as a constitutive part of normative competence, in 
addition to the epistemic and motivational abilities typically stressed in philosophical accounts.  
The attitudes and narratives of others in the socialisation process mediate our self-narratives, 
motivational structure, belief system, and perceptual lens, resulting in a self-in-relation.  This term 
captures how the self is always in some kind of relation towards others, our environment, and 
ourselves: it is a relation-to-others as well as a relation-to-self.  As Mitchell describes, ‘[b]eing a 
self with others entails a constant dialectic between attachment and self-definition, between 
connection and differentiation, a continual negotiation between one’s own subjective reality and a 
consensual reality of others with whom one lives’ (Mitchell 1988,  p. 149).  
A competent self-in-relation is developed through three kinds of interpersonal, 
recognitional bonds: (i) respect; (ii) trust, and (iii) esteem (Kong 2017; Kong forthcoming).  First, 
when others treat us with respect, individuals are viewed as selves whose bodies and reasons have 
worth and deserve consideration – we internalise this as a form of self-respect where we believe 
ourselves to be of value; our reasons deserve regard, as does our physical integrity, choices, and 
values.  Second, trustful interpersonal relations become internalised as self-trust.  When others 
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recognise and validate conative aspects of our agency – our emotions, needs, perceptions, and 
desires – we likewise come to explore, trust, and validate these facets of our agency.  We view and 
assert our own needs as appropriate and accurate responses to the situations we encounter in the 
world.  Third, self-esteem is developed when we internalise a dynamic self-definition and 
belonging within our community and relationships; our activities are seen as positive 
contributions, leading to a sense of connection yet individual separateness.  Nurturing 
recognitional bonds ultimately become reflected in a relation-to-self constituted by realistic, 
nurturing attitudes towards one’s needs, agency, and identity.  It equips the self with the 
competencies and tools to maintain sufficient flexibility in engaging with others, yet firm in one’s 
resolve about the fundamental relation-to-self, constituted by self-respect, self-trust, and self-
esteem. 
By contrast, the internalisation of punitive, distrustful narratives culminates in problems 
navigating selfhood as situated within relation, both vis-à-vis others as well as with oneself.  This 
is a particular problem in individuals with borderline.  Ample evidence reveals that the diagnosis 
is closely connected to past experiences of trauma, sexual and physical abuse, deprivation, 
punishment, and subjugation (Young et al 2003).  The subjective impact of this interpersonal 
context is profound, leading to the internalisation of different modes of misrecognition based on 
disrespect, distrust, and lack of esteem.  When we experience subjugating, degrading, and 
disrespectful treatment by others, we come to see this as acceptable behaviour and replicate it in 
our engagement with our own selves.  When a recognitional framework of trust is absent, our 
intrapersonal framework can become inflexible, underdeveloped, or fail to track the features of the 
world accurately.  Conative reactions to the world are suppressed; we become uncertain about our 
needs and how to respond appropriately towards them.  When we lack self-esteem, there is 
detachment from our community; our own personal characteristics, activities and goals are 
devalued, contributing to our sense of displacement.  Ultimately, dysfunctional belief systems and 
self-destructive coping mechanisms become consistent expressions of the self.  
Relational contexts characterised by invalidation, fear, and hostility cultivate a fractured, 
inauthentic self-in-relation, precisely because ‘the individual is encouraged to bring into play only 
those aspects of her inner experience that fit the inner experience of another’ (Becker 1997, p. 
108).  Here the importance of trust demands deeper examination.  Trust fosters authentic 
responsiveness to and discernment of reality so that one has ‘a balance of giving and receiving 
which helps her respond to that situation with care, competence, and an attitude of fairness’ 
(Cotroneo 1986, p. 414).  Interpersonal and intrapersonal trust are dialectical parts of the same 
coin.  A trusting self-in-relation constantly negotiates between one’s own perceptions and 
interpretations of reality with that of others, oscillating between one’s attachment to and 
separateness from others.  One situates oneself within relation to others, but also adopts a separate 
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stance from this interpersonal relation, particularly should it depart from one’s relation-to-self (see 
Meyers 1984, pp. 83-4). 
By contrast, an invalidating environment breeds distrust of one’s own experience and 
interpretation of reality.  Such an environment tells the individual that she cannot trust herself, her 
needs, and her responses to the world, making her reality outward orientated so that she looks to 
others for cues as to how she should act or feel (Becker 1997).  Attending to the social process 
behind the development of inauthentic but egosyntonic disordered selves illuminates precisely 
why women in particular have been prone towards borderline personality.  Many girls are raised to 
suppress their own need for care and nurture, particularly in familial environments dominated by 
fear and conditionality.  Conative expressions of one’s authentic self – emotions, feelings, and 
needs – are punished, minimised, or treated in an erratic manner.  Subjective assessments of her 
own experience are viewed as wrong, inaccurate, and untrustworthy (Becker 1997).  Or her 
emotional response is attributed to shameful characterological traits, such as ‘overreactivity, 
oversensitivity, paranoia, a distorted view of events, or a failure to adopt a positive attitude’ 
(Linehan 1993, p. 50).  In short, she is told her real, private self, comprised of suppressed emotions 
and needs, is of little value.  With threats of hostility or fear around loss of love, her subjective 
reality becomes the reality of those around her, stifling the constant negotiation between 
attachment and separateness, between connection and self-definition, which is necessary to 
develop a healthy self-in-relation.  The self becomes conflated with other, and subsequently 
becomes the model that is replicated in future relationships.  Individuals are unable to articulate 
their private experiences and manage their emotions.  They distrust their grasp of the world, and 
struggle to set feasible expectations on themselves as well as others.  In Becker’s words, ‘Clearly 
for women on the border, there is little flexibility within the self to draw upon; there is barely a 
self to call up’ (1997, p. 127). 
Indeed, the context of invalidation and distrust helps explain the characteristic 
overdependency in borderline individuals.  In such an environment, she literally lives ‘in the eyes 
of others’ (Becker 1997, p. 124).  She depends on, not just the critical second-personal judgements 
which comprise her identity, but also on caretakers who may in fact harm her, further distorting 
her ability to discern the reality of abusive circumstances and those that mean her harm.  The 
idealisation of altruism, other-regardedness and nurturance in feminine socialisation exacerbates 
her distorted perceptions and the development of the inauthentic self.  Girls are often raised with 
the view that they need to put others first and suppress their need for care.  In environments of 
conditional love and invalidation, a daughter may nurture and affirm the needs of her abusive 
parents to the neglect her own.  This impulse, Horney explains, is motivated by the girls’ need for 
safety and love, and her fear that she will lose both.  Alongside this fear will be anger, as a protest 
against those who denigrate, neglect, and abuse her.  But ultimately, her fear comes to trump the 
anger against those who devalue her authentic needs and emotions.  She represses her anger and 
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the caretaker who is feared and resented, is idealised and admired.  Instead, anger is turned 
towards herself, converting her ‘true and warranted accusations of others’ to ‘untrue and 
unwarranted self-accusations’ (Horney 1942 p. 50), thereby making herself ‘the object of […] her 
own hostility’ (Westkott 1986, p. 75).  Emotional invalidation and narratives about her bad or evil 
character lead to secondary negative emotions of self-blame, self-accusation, and self-punishment 
which eventually motivate self-injurious behaviour (Becker 1997). 
This complex picture of developing borderline psychopathology explains how, in 
Benson’s words, the self-harming individual acts ‘willfully’ but is ‘unable to govern the content of 
[her] will’ (Benson 1994, p. 651).  To return to Anne, the abusive context in which she has 
become the person she is has meant that certain features of herself are unavoidable, even if these 
features are mistaken, unwise, harmful, or rest on a skewed perception of the world and of herself. 
Her interactivity rests on capacities that have developed from coping with her oppressive 
circumstances.  These capacities might have done her very well to endure her trauma or abusive 
context, but they outlive their usefulness as she attempts to navigate and interact with new 
circumstances.  She lacks a competent self-in-relation at two levels: at an epistemological level, 
she lacks the ability to know and trust herself, as well as the right and wrong way of relating to 
herself and to others; at an ethical level, she lacks the motivational resources to treat herself with 
nurturing care and act from an authentic self.  The ability to recognise certain reasons and control 
the content of her will (i.e. reasons of self-care, self-nurturing) remain entirely external to her.  
This isn’t to say that Anne doesn’t have the potential to change, but it would be unjustifiable to 
hold her accountable for her self-injurious behaviour at the present time, even if her clinician has 
encouraged her to act otherwise.  This nuanced account of developing borderline psychopathology 
indicates that a therapeutic approach focused primarily on responsibility for action may in fact 
replicate internalised forms of self-blame and self-accusation, inadvertently holding victims – 
particularly women – as accountable for their own psychological abuse and oppression. 
Therapeutic mechanisms instead need to problematise the presumed authenticity of and 
responsibility for the substantive content of the will in the fractured self-in-relation.  Nurturing 
recognitional bonds focused on intrapersonal and interpersonal emotional connection, validating 
and accepting the person’s current perspective and meeting suppressed subjective needs, will 
eventually help cultivate a dynamic, authentic, and responsible self-in-relation.  
 
Two Therapeutic Examples 
 
Not all therapeutic treatments of BPD take the responsibility of the individual as a point of 
departure in treating BPD.  Other therapies rely on different mechanisms for change which track 
and respond to the complex egosyntonic nature of borderline self-narratives and self-harming 
behaviour.  In the remainder of the paper, I want to illustrate this with two therapies that have been 
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shown to be highly promising treatments for BPD: Schema-Focused Therapy (SFT) and 
Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) (Giesen-Bloo et al 2016; Bamelis et al 2014; Linehan et al 
2006; Bohus 2004).  Both therapies emphasise listening and understanding the testimony of the 
BPD individual and on establishing a strong therapeutic relationship premised on Rogerian 
positive regard, warmth, genuineness, trust, and acceptance.iv  But there are a number of crucial 
differences between the two (Fassbinder et al 2016): DBT emphasises the acquisition of emotional 
regulation skills, whereas SFT rarely addresses emotional regulation directly but focuses on 
healing adverse childhood experience and trauma.  This divergent focus reflects important 
differences in the background and theoretical basis of each therapy.  To be clear, I am not 
proposing that one therapy has greater efficacy than the other (and no studies thus far compare the 
two in clinical trials).  Rather, my primary aim in this section is to draw out how the analysis 
above plays out in both, particularly in the use of validation in DBT and limited reparenting in 
SFT. 
DBT rests on a dialectic of acceptance and change.  This dialectic is important because the 
very basis of the therapy recognises the counterproductive nature of focusing exclusively on 
change strategies which emphasise the BPD individual’s self-responsibility and ability to do 
otherwise.  DBT developed out an observation that the problem-solving skills used in standard 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) could be experienced as emotionally invalidating to BPD 
patients and thereby detrimental to therapeutic goals.  For example, Linehan describes how 
emotionally invalidating environments are ‘generally intolerant of displays of negative affect’ and 
the ‘attitude communicated is similar to the “you can pull yourself up by the bootstraps” approach; 
it is the belief that any individual who tries hard enough can make it’ (Linehan 1993, p. 50).  A 
therapeutic approach based solely on the BPD individual’s need to change could work to reinforce 
her subjective emotional invalidation, distrust, and self-punishment.  Indeed, DBT warns against 
the presumption of apparent competence of the BPD individual:  
 
The discrepancy between appearance and actuality simply perpetuates the invalidating 
environment.  The absence of expected competence is attributed to lack of motivation, “not 
trying,” playing games, manipulations, or other actors discrepant with the individual’s 
phenomenal experience.  Thus a major consequence of this borderline syndrome is that it 
supports the therapist and others in “blaming the victim” and blinds them to the patient’s need 
for assistance in learning new behavioural patterns.  (pp. 83-4) 
 
Validation strategies which nurture and acknowledge the wisdom of the patient’s point of view 
within her current context are the necessary counterpart to change strategies (cognitive and 
behavioural treatment) in DBT.  Validation is crucial, not just to situate and balance behavioural 
techniques, but because it is ‘needed to teach the patient to validate herself’ (p. 225), particularly 
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to trust her own original emotional and cognitive perspective on events and behavioural reactions.  
In fact, ‘At the beginning of therapy, before a strong relationship has been formed, validation may 
be the principal intervention’ (Linehan 1997, p. 387, emphasis added). 
There are four dimensions of validation in DBT: (i) emotional; (ii) behavioural; (iii) 
cognitive; and (iv) cheerleading.  Emotional validation strategies apply a distinction between 
primary / authentic and secondary / learned emotions: the maladaptive emotions typical of BPD 
are seen as learned reactions to a primary, authentic emotion.  It could come in the form of 
suppressing that emotion, inhibiting full expression of the authentic emotion.  The point of this 
distinction is so that the primary, authentic emotion is recognised and affirmed, where it is 
acknowledged that both sets of emotions provide understandable adaptive information for a 
person’s motivation and response to an event (p. 227).  Behavioural validation strategies likewise 
reinforce that a person’s actions and current behaviour is understandable, where therapists seek out 
the validity within their responses.  Crucially, this requires challenging a distorted sense of 
‘should’ in BPD individuals – where they have a strong sense of a need to do otherwise, that they 
‘should’ behave differently.  In fact, DBT recommends appealing to a mechanistic explanation of 
behaviour at times, to communicate that ‘everything that happens should happen, given the context 
of the world; in principle, everything is understandable’ (p. 238).  Cognitive validation focuses on 
recognising, verbalising, understanding, and seeing the kernel of truth in the person’s expressed 
and unexpressed thoughts, beliefs, and the underlying rules behind their thinking.  This approach 
differs again in an important way from standard CBT approaches, which stress critically 
challenging or refuting the logic of certain patterns of thinking.  Instead, DBT focuses on 
validating the knowing of the patient, to have an orientation towards the patient which recognises 
their experiential ways of knowing and respecting their different way of seeing things (pp. 240-2).  
Finally, cheerleading strategies are essential to counteract a sense of hopelessness, emphasise the 
therapist’s belief and confidence in the patient and her inner capabilities, assuming the best of her, 
and encourage her based on a realistic assessment of her capabilities. 
The different levels of validation together provide a source of support and nurture for BPD 
individuals as they currently are; they facilitate a therapeutic connection between the patient and 
therapist by making them understood.  They ultimately function as a model to teach self-
validation, where individuals acquire in the first place skills of ‘nonjudgemental self-observation 
and nonpejorative descriptions of the self’ (Linehan 1997, p. 388, emphases added).  The goal is 
for individuals to cultivate trust in their self-in-relation, where they trust their emotional, 
behavioural, and cognitive responses modelled after the validating and trustful bonds in the 
patient-therapist relationship.  The noncritical, nonjudgemental nature of this is crucial, because it 
indicates that to promote change and a different kind of agency need not demand nor impose on 
the BPD person that she should be able to exercise better volitional control, that she needs to do 
otherwise and somehow falls short.  Instead, DBT validation displaces capacitation and 
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interactivity based on invalidation to that of validation and the safe exploration of authentic 
emotional, behavioural, and cognitive parts of the self.  
Validation strategies in DBT overlap in some ways with Schema-Focused Therapy, and 
indeed, the nonjudgemental nature of the therapists’ acceptance is likewise essential to the latter.  
However, whereas DBT focuses on accepting the current self and the emotional, behavioural, and 
cognitive dimensions of the patient’s perspective, SFT’s explicit focus is nurturing the unmet 
needs of the child within the BPD self.  DBT’s use of validation to improve coping strategies and 
symptom reduction will lead to some exploration of the BPD person’s past, but this isn’t its main 
focus.  For SFT, by contrast, emotional regulation is not addressed directly and the therapeutic 
focus is on cultivating a shared understanding of root causes for BPD symptoms stemming from 
the psychological trauma of adverse childhood experience (Fassbinder et al 2016). 
This divergent focus stems from the underlying philosophy of SFT which views 
individuals with borderline as psychologically and emotionally very young children with 
inadequate intrapersonal / interpersonal supports, unmet needs, as well as a core fear of 
abandonment (Kellogg and Young 2006).  Schema refers to ‘a pattern imposed on reality or 
experience to help individuals explain it, to mediate perception, and to guide their responses’ 
(Young et al 2003, p. 6).  Early maladaptive schemas develop as a result of adverse childhood 
experiences and are ‘reality-based representations of a child’s environment’ (i.e. ‘my environment 
is unsafe’; ‘my caretakers do not care for me’, ‘I need to suppress the expression of anger’), but 
are no longer accurate or useful later in life.  Different modes of the self form part of the 
borderline personality constellation; these modes involve specific schemas or ways of coping 
which become dissociated from other modes – indeed, the therapy works towards the reintegration 
of the different modes by targeting an individual’s suppressed needs.  These include child modes 
(the abandoned / abused and the  angry / impulsive child); dysfunctional parent modes (the 
punitive parent); dysfunctional coping modes (the detached protector); and the healthy adult mode.   
The abandoned / abused child is a core state of the borderline child, representing ‘the 
suffering inner child’.  Here ‘the patient appears fragile and childlike […] seem sorrowful, frantic, 
frightened, unloved, lost’ where they are seeking a parental figure to take care of them (Kellogg 
and Young 2006, p. 308).  The angry and impulsive child represents the part of the child who 
recognises that her needs were unmet and expresses rage about her mistreatment caused by abuse, 
abandonment, deprivation, subjugation, rejection, and punishment (Young et al 2003).  As 
discussed, the BPD individual is in a doublebind with the expression of anger: even as it is 
expressed, it often triggers the desire to self-punish the abandoned/abused child, since childhood 
experiences frequently meant the expression of anger and emotion was forbidden, suppressed or 
punished.  Displays of rage are often followed by self-punitive acts such as cutting, effectively 
replicating dynamics of the family situation (Kellogg and Young 2006).  The expression of normal 
needs and reactions – like anger – can trigger the punitive parent mode, dominated by a form of 
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inner abuse which represents the individual’s identification with and internalisation of her parents’ 
‘loathing, abuse, subjugation’ (Young et al 2003, p. 310).  The self is punished for ‘being bad or 
evil’ through self-injurious, parasuicidal and self-destructive behaviour.  The detached protector 
mode is also connected to the suppression of normal needs and feelings.  Here the BPD patient 
behaves in a disconnected, isolated manner and can give the impression of ‘apparent competence’: 
individuals are ‘good patients’, acting in accordance with others’ expectations, and many 
therapists mistakenly reinforce the detached protector mode as a result.  But remaining in this 
mode can be counterproductive to treatment due to individuals’ focus on the therapist’s approval 
and disengagement from their own needs and feelings.  It can suppress a healthy negotiation 
between connection and self-definition, encouraging instead longstanding patterns where the 
person’s subjective reality is based on that of others due to the threat or fear of their disapproval.   
 The mode completely absent or extremely weak in the BPD individual is the healthy adult 
which helps nurture other aspects of the self (i.e. protects and affirms the vulnerable child, sets 
boundaries for the angry child, and challenges the punitive parent mode).  Through the use of 
limited reparenting and experiential techniques, SFT helps establish and strengthen this mode 
whilst reintegrating the child schema modes by meeting their unmet needs.  Limited reparenting 
differs in important ways from the ‘good’ parent who is educating her child on acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour.  A child could be chastised and experience negative consequences, 
without major harm to herself, so long as the environment and relationship is one of unconditional 
love, acceptance, and encouragement.  The admonishment is contextualised within 
overwhelmingly affirming recognitional bonds.  Yet the opposite often holds in the experience of 
borderline individuals.  Reprimands and punitive measures will be mediated through the lens of 
one’s experience of belittlement and misrecognition.  Limited reparenting – the ‘first among 
equals’ (Kellogg and Young 2006, p. 451) – is more like a good foster parent who intervenes in a 
child’s life after years of subjugation, invalidation, and neglect.  Similar to validation strategies in 
DBT, this good foster parent recognises and affirms the expression of emotions and needs whilst 
overturning prior self-punitive, self-subjugating narratives that are internalised by the child.  
Limited parenting supports the core belief that BPD individuals did not have their fundamental 
emotional needs met by their caregivers and an important part of therapy is to compensate for this 
absence, providing an ‘antidote’ within certain professional boundaries, creating an environment 
that is safe, nurturing, protective, forgiving, and encouraging of self-expression’ (Young et al 
2003, p. 326).  This provides individuals with a nurturing base, a ‘holding environment’ (Kellogg 
and Young 2006, p. 452) to help BPD individuals displace these dysfunctional modes and 
internalise the nurturing, validating narratives of the therapist.  In other words, prior to any 
cognitive and behavioural retraining, SFT focuses on meeting the emotional needs of the child, of 
providing crucial self-nurturing skills that provide the necessary infrastructure on which 
responsible agency can develop in the first place.  Phases of treatment and mechanisms of change 
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are structured accordingly, with a particular focus on emotion-focused / experiential techniques 
involving the use of dialogue and imagery work to help individuals to connect and process 
emotions, clarify its biographical background, and alter the meaning of emotions and needs 
through emotional restructuring.  
For instance, an extremely powerful strategy used in SFT is imagery rescripting, where 
maladaptive schemas are connected to childhood trauma, effectively bridging the current self with 
the unmet needs of the child modes.  In these rescriptings the therapist tries to connect with the 
vulnerable child – nurturing, praising, and encouraging this part of the self, or validating her sense 
of injustice and anger, whilst defending her against the punitive parent voice.  The therapist 
intervenes in the connective memory by stopping the perpetrator of abuse and caring for and 
soothing the child in the image, and taking her to a place of safety and security.  This technique in 
SFT helps heal the child modes and their unmet needs which cause the dysfunctional coping 
modes, until the healthy adult mode of the person is strong enough to intervene.  Chair dialogs can 
also be used to try and externalise the punitive parent voice, where modes are placed on different 
chairs and dialogues are performed from the relevant mode.  This technique can be used to 
encourage the self-punishing part of personal identity to become egodystonic, gradually creating a 
separation between the burgeoning authentic self and the punishing, critical voice.   
This therapeutic process can be difficult.  Affirmations praising the abandoned child will 
often be rejected and instead intensify the punitive parent voice, particularly given the external 
nature of self-nurturing narratives to the borderline individual’s personal identity.  Indeed, 
nurturing the abandoned / abused child can itself trigger self-mutilating, self-punitive behaviours.  
For this reason, SFT also uses cognitive techniques to enact a proactive process of narrative repair, 
where BPD individuals are educated about the truth of self-nurturing reasons, affirming their valid 
needs to have a stable base, receive love and acceptance within a relational framework of respect.  
Importantly, SFT eschews any punitive or blaming responses and maintains that positive shaping 
is a more effective way of altering one’s behaviour.  When it comes to self-harm, the therapeutic 
task is to convey an attitude of warmth, concern, and empathy for the borderline patient whilst 
creating distance from the action.v  The therapeutic focus remains on resolving the underlying 
causes of borderline selfhood rather than explicitly managing the destructive acts and behaviours 
which express the psychopathology.  In fact, too much attention on the act of self-harm, 
particularly in adolescents, can inadvertently reinforce the behaviour by creating dependency on 
the therapist.  Instead, the approach stresses that therapists need to strike a delicate balance 
between compassion and kindness for the BPD individual, offering alternative short-term coping 
strategies for addressing distress and eliminating the reinforcement of secondary gains (i.e. self-
harm as a strategy to elicit care).vi   
Notably, both DBT and SFT are long-term, intensive therapies; both rely heavily on the 
skill of the therapist to withhold judgement, criticism, and blame.  They demand advanced skills of 
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empathy, acceptance, interpretation, and an appreciation of the complexity of BPD selfhood, just 
to even establish trust with individuals whose default mode is to distrust others, keep them at 
arms-length, and self-punish.vii  DBT validation and SFT limited reparenting pinpoint neatly where 
responsibility without blame could be therapeutically detrimental.  First, the focus on taking 
responsibility may in fact encourage the ways of relating to oneself which can impede the 
development of a competent self-in-relation.  Both DBT and SFT caution against therapists 
mistakenly assuming the competence of borderline patients, which can lead them to distrust and 
disengage from conative aspects of one’s identity rather than the subjective acceptance and 
understanding that is sorely needed in BPD individuals to develop an authentic sense of their own 
identity.  Second, a focus on self-responsibility ignores the nurture that is needed prior to self-
reflection and subjective change.  Validation and limited reparenting strategies constitute the 
crucial first phases of therapy in DBT and SFT respectively, with these approaches recognising 
that behavioural change techniques when introduced too early can be highly rejecting, 
invalidating, and punitive to the BPD individual – not only confirming their self-abnegating 
narratives that often motivate self-mutilation, but potentially damaging the therapeutic alliance 
irrevocably.   
By contrast, agency understood in terms of interactivity and capacitation in relation to 
DBT and SFT therapy is twofold: first, it is truer to the complex phenomenology of self-harming 
in borderline, involving a cycle of unmet needs, difficulties with and attempts to control strong 
emotion, as well as punitive, egosyntonic motives.  Even as the borderline person acts, she lacks 
the normative competence of responsibility, as her motivational structure, beliefs, and perceptions 
are so egosyntonically shaped around pernicious, subjugating narratives that they cannot be said to 
reflect an authentically competent self-in-relation.  In other words, the interactivity of the BPD 
individual is premised on invalidating capacitation.  Indeed, the therapeutic intervention is 
precisely to create some space between subjugating, oppressive narratives and the self, to provide 
an alternative cluster of validating and nurturing capacities premised on self-acceptance, self-trust, 
self-respect, and self-esteem.  Second, the fact that the self-harming coping behaviour of the 
borderline individual emerges out of relational circumstances suggests that treating it 
therapeutically will likewise be a relational rather than individual endeavour.  Strategies of 
narrative repair, positive validation, and the establishment of nurturing recognitional bonds work 
to counter individual’s subjective experience and cultivate an authentic self-in-relation.  These are 
necessary preconditions for a responsible self to emerge in the first place.  The possibility of 
responsible agency that is premised on validating and nurturing capacitation remains necessary for 
therapy because it provides a crucial orientation of optimism and hope.  But this should not be a 
normative perspective imposed upon the self-harming, BPD individual in the first instance, 
particularly if she has experienced nothing but belittlement and invalidation.  What is more 
important is how this optimistic, hopeful orientation from a therapeutic perspective can help build 
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mutual relations of trust, vulnerability, and affective engagement which will teach fractured selves 
crucial skills of self-nurture, emboldening them to trust and validate their legitimate needs, and 
eventually internalise and believe in the possibility of relating to themselves and to others in an 
authentic and responsible way.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I am in agreement with Pickard’s view that clinical attitudes towards those with 
personality disorder often falls worryingly short.  But the argument in this paper is that Pickard’s 
solution of responsibility without blame does not prioritise sufficiently the subjective 
phenomenology of self-harm, nor provides sufficient distance from widespread clinical views 
about these patients possessing control over their behaviour.  The more dangerous trajectory of 
such narratives is how it implicitly holds women responsible and answerable for their inability to 
nurture and care for themselves.  Rather ironically, ‘[t]he woman who believes her character to be 
at issue may have difficulty protecting herself from maltreatment in the future’ (Becker 1997, p. 
138).  Instead, I have questioned in this paper whether it makes sense to speak of the borderline 
person as responsible for her self-harming behaviour from either a philosophical or therapeutic 
perspective.  From a philosophical perspective, we need to consider the social and relational 
constituents of substantive content of the will which may encourage or oppress the development of 
a competent and authentic self-in-relation.  Prior to the development of responsible agency is the 
meeting of emotional and conative needs in a trusting intersubjective context that is validating and 
accepting, without which the intrapersonal and interpersonal relations of the self are prone to 
distortion and inauthenticity.  As I have also explored through validation in DBT and limited 
reparenting in SFT, behaviour that accords with what is perceived to be ‘responsible behaviour’ 
does not necessarily reflect an authentic self-in-relation.  Future qualitative work could further 
elucidate the clinical application of my argument by undertaking in-depth examinations of the 
subjective experience and phenomenology of self-harm, as well as the attitudes towards BPD 
agency amongst clinicians practicing SFT and DBT.  Ultimately, cultivating a dynamic and 
authentic self-in-relation depends on a collaborative, therapeutic process based on of mutual 
vulnerability and compassion, so as to cultivate a nurturing personal identity that can navigate a 
necessary dialectic between self and other, between separateness and connection, between 
subjective reality and the consensual reality of those around us.viii 
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i In Kong forthcoming, I suggest that authenticity is a problematic criteria on which to base assessments of 
mental capacity.  The argument here coheres with this claim, particularly as decision-making capacity is 
often equated either with (i) a thin account of autonomy which may reflect deeply self-abnegating, 
egosyntonic disorders or (ii) an account of authenticity that equates the mentally disordered self with the 
inauthentic (and incapacitous) self.  The view I am proposing here is a refinement of my argument – I am 
not committed to the view that an egosytonic, disordered self is necessarily inauthentic, but rather emphasise 
the importance of understanding the genealogical origin of developing psychopathology, particularly in 
contexts which denigrate expressions of authentic needs and emotions and socialise individuals accordingly. 
ii According to Gallop 2002, p. 25: ‘Attempting to stop behavior through self-harm contracts or other 
restrictive means will only escalate self-harm efforts, reduce any ambivalence about the self-harm behavior, 
and add to secrecy. If a nurse or therapist refuses to see or treat a woman because of self-harm, he or she 
may be removing the only effective coping strategy, which may lead to more serious self-harm behavior or 
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suicide. The goal is to help the person deal with the intense affect and the function of self-harm, not to 
become involved in power struggles.’  
iii Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
iv These have important overlaps with other therapies, such as Judith Herman’s classic work on trauma and 
recovery (1997).  For the sake of brevity, however, I focus mainly on SFT and DBT. 
v Thanks to Suky MacPherson for making this and the next couple points. 
vi i.e. Encouraging individuals to use red markers instead of scissors, holding ice rather than cutting, 
smashing plates.  This might be through a kind but not overly dramatic or effusive response to a young girl’s 
self-harming behaviour.  It is akin to Aristotle’s virtue of the mean – being responsive and understanding, 
but not so much so that it becomes a barrier to the patient’s healing. 
vii Young et al state that ‘majority of patients with BPD cannot accept and benefit from cognitive-behavioral 
techniques until they trust both the therapist and the stability of the reparenting bond’ (2003, p. 327). 
viii My thanks to Julia Blazdell for our discussions about BPD and self-harm, Hanna Pickard for comments 
on an earlier draft, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.  Many thanks also to Diana 
Bogner, Michel van Vresswijk, Arnoud Arntz, and especially Suky MacPherson for explaining crucial 
aspects of their clinical expertise on Schema Therapy in treating BPD, as well as to Gillian Butler for 
discussing at length her observations around issues of selfhood in the context of her clinical approach to 
BPD treatment. 
